

formed the Council that the Central Intelligence Agency was preparing a Special National Intelligence Estimate, see Document 40. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The Council noted Gray's briefing and the Planning Board's work in NSC Action No. 1958. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

40. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 30-3-58

Washington, August 12, 1958.

ARAB NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

The Problem

To estimate the present status of Arab nationalism as a factor in the Middle East situation.

Discussion

I. Present Situation

1. With increasing rapidity over the past three years, the Western-supported conservative governments of the Middle East have seen their influence and authority slip away. The revolution in Iraq brought the strongest of the conservative Arab states into Nasser's radical Pan-Arab camp. This left its partner in the Arab Union, Jordan, so unstable that even the presence of UK troops may be insufficient to maintain King Hussein on the throne. Lebanon, once the Arab state having the closest connections with the West, has experienced an insurrection, the outcome of which appears almost certain to be the adoption of a position of neutrality and of accommodation with Nasser. In Saudi Arabia, Crown

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate, submitted by the CIA, was prepared by CIA, INR, and the intelligence organizations of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with the estimate on August 12, except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.